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Abstract 
The  creation  of  parks and preserves in less developed  countries is 
seen as  an important  step in  preserving  biodiversity  and genetic 
information (Dixon and Sherman 1990). The establishment of  a park 
or preserve, however,  is often seen as a threat by  rural residents if 
they are denied  access to areas where hunting, gathering or small 
scale  agricultural  provided  them  with  food,  fuel  or  marketable 
products.  In a  series of  papers Norgaard  (1981,  1984 and  1985) 
advocates  development  strategies  that  promote  coevolution  of 
socioeconomic  and  ecological  systems.  In  this  dynamic  context, 
coevolution  might  be  defined  by  a  set of  trajectories  describing 
economic  welfare  and  biodiversity  that remain  within  "acceptable" 
bounds  over  some  future  horizon.  (1) What  are  some  possible 
measures for economic welfare and biodiversity?  (2) How might one 
identify the scale and location of  hunting, gathering and agricultural 
activities within a buffer zone to a park or preserve that would qualify 
as  coevolutionary.  (3) How  might  one  optimize  over  the  set  of 
coevolutionary  strategies?  A  methodology  is  proposed  to  address 
these questions and to  explore the economic incentives that might 
support a  coevolutionary  strategy in the buffer  zone  to  a  park  or 
preserve. 
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I.  htxocfuction and Overview 
The past decade has seen heightened awareness of  the need to 
preserve biological diversity.  The U. S. Office of  Technology 
Assessment defines biological diversity in the following way. 
Biological diversity refers to the variety and variability among living 
organisms and the ecological complexes in which they occur. 
Diversity can be defined as the number of  different items and their 
relative frequency.  For biological diversity, these items are organized 
at many levels, ranging from complete ecosystems to the chemical 
structures that are the molecular basis of  heredity.  Thus, the term 
encompasses different ecosystems, species, genes, and their relative 
abundance.  (Office of  Technology Assessment 1987, p. 3) 
Strategies to maintain biological diversity include the collection and 
storage of  germplasm ex situ and the establishment of  parks and 
preserves that would protect species in sifu.  While there are 
important and threatened ecosystems in temperate zones, the focus of 
recent preservation efforts has been in the tropics. where natural 
areas are highly diverse and under intense development pressure. 
Dixon and Sherman (1990, p. ll)  note that since the 1970s most of the new national parks have been located in developing countries. 
The opportunity cost of  establishing a system of  parks or preserves in 
such countries may be relatively high. particularly when viewed 
through the eyes of  impoverished rural residents who practiced 
agriculture within the park or harvested resources for subsistence or 
cash income. 
Less developed countries (LDCs) are usually strapped for funds 
to manage parks and preserves and if  the establishment of  a park is 
not seen as beneficial or fair to local residents, "poaching" of  plants 
and animals may become a significant problem and enforcement costs 
may be substantial.  At  one extreme, the park or preserve may become 
a "fortress" guarded by soldiers of  the central government.  At  the 
other extreme, if enforcement is lax, excessive hunting, gathering and 
agricultural practices may continue to significantly degrade the park, 
reduce biological diversity and defeat the objectives of  establishing the 
park in the first place. 
In a series of  articles Norgaard  (1981, 1984 and 1985) 
extended the biological notion of  coevolution, where two or more 
species may interact and advantageously evolve over time, to the 
coevolution of  a socioeconomic system and its supporting 
environment.  This perspective placed emphasis on finding a set of economic activities and social institutions that could evolve with the 
natural environment in a nondestructive way. 
This paper explores some models and methods which might 
operationalize the notion of  coevolution.  To  make things concrete we 
wilI consider a park and buffer zone recently established in a LDC and 
will try to answer the following questions. 
1.  What economic activities might be permitted in the buffer zone 
surrounding a park? 
2.  What is the net economic value of  various activities to individuals or 
households living in or adjacent to the buffer zone? 
3.  How will the scale and duration of  such activities affect 
biodiversity? 
4.  How can we  display the trade-offs between net economic value and 
biodiversity in a way that is useful to managers and the affected 
households? 
The next section develops a model and some methods that 
might be used to evaluate economic activities within a buffer zone, in 
terms of  the stream of  net revenue they generate over time and their 
impact on an index of  biodiversity.  This approach would define 
coevolution as a set of  feasible economic activities that results in 
acceptable trajectories for both net revenue and the index of 
biodiversity.  The set of  coevolutionary strategies might be further 
narrowed by equity considerations.  From the set of  activities that are coevolutionary and "economically  just" one might recommend those 
that maximize the present value of  net revenues. 
The third section examines the institutional and management 
policies that might be employed to promote the adoption of 
coevolutionary activities by residents living adjacent to the park.  The 
assignment of  exclusive rights for hotel accommodations, food service, 
guided tours, and the conduct of  certain agricultural, hunting and 
gathering activities within the buffer zone or park is discussed.  The 
fourth section summarizes the major conclusions of  the paper and 
identifies the type of  research that will be needed if  national and 
international agencies seek to promote coevolutionary development. 
11.  A Model  of Coevoiutioln 
The model to evaluate coevolutionary strategies, while naive, 
will illustrate the type of  information needed and the analysis that 
could be conducted.  It is based on the following notation. 
A,j,,  is the level (or scale) of  activity i in sector j in period t. 
where i = 1.2  ...., I,  j = 1,2  ,...,  5,  t = 0.1  ,...,  T, (see Figure  1). 
n, is the net value per unit, per period derived from activity i, 
&,  is the abundance of  "keystone" species k in period t, 
where k = 1,2,..  .,K, &  is the maximum abundance (carrying capacity) of  keystone 
species k, 
A,  is an (W)  matrix of  buffer zone activities in period t, 
X, is a (Kxl)  vector of  species abundance in period t, 
B, is an index of  biodiversity in period t, and 
p = 1/(1  + 6) is a discount factor and 6 is the periodic discount 
rate. 
The model will assume that the population dynamics of  the 
keystone species can be described by the system of  difference 
equations 
Equation (1)  says that the abundance of  species k in period t+l  will 
possibly depend on the abundance of  all keystone species and on the 
level of  all activities in all sectors of  the buffer zone. 
The index of  biodiversity is assumed to take the following form where a is a scaling parameter.  If  a = 1, then the biodiversity index 
ranges from 0  to 1, inclusive, and becomes zero if  any keystone 
species goes extinct.  (This assumes Xk,t (  Xk for all t.) 
The net revenue to households living in or adjacent to the 
buffer zone in period t may be calculated as 
The present (or discounted) net revenue from &,j,t  is 
At  least three comments are in order.  First, the dynamics of 
keystone species has been limited to a simple system of  first-order 
difference equations.  In reality there are likely to be lags between 
activities &,j,t  and species abundance.  This may necessitate the use of 
delay-difference equations and the adoption of  a sufficiently lengthy 
horizon in order to identify the full, long-run effects of  on all 
keystone species. Second, estimation and validation system (1) will require time 
series estimates of  the keystone species as they evolve in response to a 
particular &j,t . Unless the number of  keystone species is small, such 
annual surveys may be time consuming and expensive. 
Third, the biodiversity index requires an estimate of  park 
carrying capacity, Xk. for each keystone species and assumes that 
carrying capacity is unchanging over the horizon of  analysis.  As an 
alternative, we might consider an index proposed by Odem (1963). 
which takes the form B,  = &/(In M,),  where K, is the number of 
keystone species in existence in period  t and Mt =  &t  is the total 
number of  keystone individuals in year t. 
Pielou (1969) discusses Simpson's measure of  diversity, which 
in our notation may be defined as 
This index can be regarded as the probability of  randomly drawing 
(without replacement) two individuals of  the same species.  Thus, if  B, 
is low, diversity is great, if  Bt is high, diversity is low.  Both of  the 
above indices remain positive in the face of  keystone extinction. 
7 If  the keystone species have been inventoried so that an 
estimate of  the Xk,O  is in hand, then the net value and biodiversity 
implications of  A,,,,  might he evaluated as  follows. 
1.  Select a horizon length, T = l/r, where r is an estimate of 
the intrinsic growth rate of  the slowest growing keystone species. 
Then, the horizon of  analysis will be t = 1.2  ,....  T. 
2.  For each hJ  ,  calculate the net value Nt in each period 
according to equatioi '(3)  and then the present value according to 
equation (4). The discount rate might initially be set at 6 = 0.02 
(Howe  1990). 
3.  For a particular Ai,,,t and initial condition XkVO,  we can 
simulate system (11 forward in time and obtain trajectories Xk ,  for all 
keystone species. 
4.  Calculate the biodiversity index in each period t. 
The first obvious piece of  analysis would be to plot the 
trajectories N,  and B,  associated with each &,J,t.  Suppose there is 
consensus that the index of  biodiversity should not drop below some 
level B 2 0.  Such a criterion may reduce the set of  candidate &,J,t. 
This situation is depicted in Figure 2 where the 4  .  j,  .  associated with 
N', and B't would be removed from consideration since Et drops below 
B at t = t'. 
A second criterion might be invoked to further reduce the set 
of  admissible strategies.  Suppose in each period that the net revenue 
from buffer zone activities is distributed among H households.  Let  Nh,t denote the net revenue earned (or net value of  food and resources 
consumed) by household h from buffer zone activities in period t. 
Define sh ,  = Nh  /Nt  to be the share of  household h in the net revenues 
from buffer zone activities in period t, where 1 2 s~,~  2  0.  A Lorenz 
curve can be constructed which would plot the cumulative share of 
income held by the lower pth  proportion of  households.  The Lorenz 
"curve" for a four-household case where shvt  = 0.05 for h = 1,2,3 and 
s,,,  = 0.85 is shown in Figure 3.  In general, we  will denote this curve 
by  L(p), where p = @(~~,~,...,s,,,).  The Gini ratio (Gastwirth 1972) is 
defined as the ratio of  the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45O 
line and the area under the 450 line.  In every period a Gini ratio could 
be calculated as 
This ratio measures the degree of  income inequality.  If buffer zone 
income is equally distributed in period t, then Gt = 0.  If buffer zone 
income is perfectly inequitable in distribution  (one person receives it 
all), then Gt = 1. For each activity matrix At  it would be possible to 
calculate G,, and if  the Gini ratio is too high, that activity matrix would be eliminated for being inequitable or "economically unjust."  In our 
example in Figure 3 the Gini ratio is Gt = 0.6.  This might be regarded 
as  too inequitable a distribution. 
By  restrictislg choice to those activities where the index of 
biodiversity stays above some lower bound and the Gini ratio stays 
below some upper bound it may be acceptable to maximize the present 
value of  net revenue.  Mathematically we wish to 
..- 
Maximize  I: I: I: pt nAJ.t 
Subject to  &.t+l  = FkO(t.4) 
P = @(sl,t,...,~H,t) 
~h,~  = Nhat/Nt (either Nh,t or shSt  given) 
The above approach is similar to multiobjective programing 
[Cohon and Marks 1975). where all but one objective is treated as a 
constraint.  The unconstrained objective is then maximized.  By 
sequentially varying the constraint levels (in our case the lower bound 
on B or the upper bound on G)  one could numerically identify the 
10 Pareto-efficient trade-offs between N and B or G.  When the Pareto- 
efficient points are connected in N-B or N-G  space, one would expect 
a frontier comprised of  a series of  line segments (facets) collectively 
forming a surface that is concave to the origin.  A hypothetical frontier, 
displaying the maximum N for various values of  B and fixed G. is shown 
in Figure 4. 
III.  Park Management and  Incentives for Conservation 
The designation of  land as a park or preserve might be 
relatively easy to accomplish, particularly if  the government already 
owns the land.  The protection and maintenance of  biodiversity within 
a park or preserve may not be so easily accomplished.  As noted in the 
introduction to this paper, the the ability to stop encroachment and 
degradation within a park might critically depend on the cooperation 
of  local residents. 
While economists have long called for the use of  economic 
incentives in resource management and pollution control, there now 
appears to be a greater appreciation of  such policies by wildlife 
managers and development sociologists,  If local residents can be 
given a financial stake in conservation, then the probability of 
maintaining a park and slowing the loss of  biodiversity can be 
11 increased (Dixon and Sherman p. 70).  The economic incentives that 
might be provided could include jobs within the park (serving as 
rangers or guides),  jobs within hotel, restaurant or resort facilities 
used by visitors to the park, or exclusive rights to harvest certain 
resources within the park. 
The first strategy has been referred to as "eco-tourism."  If 
ecosystems supporting interesting flora and fauna can be maintained 
within a park for tourists staying in comfortable facilities adjacent to 
the park, jobs and revenue can be generated which can support both 
local residents and park maintenance. 
Within the park or preserve it may be possible to allow 
regulated harvest of  certain resources that would not threaten, and in 
some cases might enhance, the balance and resilience of  park 
ecosystems.  Mackinnon et al. (1986) discuss systems in the Chitwan 
National Park in Nepal and the Matobo National Park in Zimbabwe 
where local villagers are allowed to harvest a certain amount of  grass 
for thatching of  roofs.  In the rainforest of  Peru, Peters, Gentry and 
Mendelsohn (1989) estimate that periodic and selective cutting of 
timber, combined with annual fruit and latex collection has a present 
value of  $6,820 per hectare.  This compares to a one-shot net revenue 
of  about $1,000 for standing timber and a subsequent present net 
12 value, if the hectare is converted to pasture, that is unlikely to exceed 
$2,960.  The authors conclude that selective harvest of  timber and the 
annual harvest of  minor forest products results in a present value that 
significantly exceeds a one-shot timber harvest and conversion to 
pasture. 
In parts of  Zimbabwe, the right to cull elephant and other 
abundant wildlife has been transferred to villages, who are in turn able 
to transfer that right to foreign hunters.  Proceeds from the trophy fee 
are divided among village members, used to purchase communally- 
owned agricultural equipment or provide other "local public goods." 
Table 1 lists a few of  the species in Zimbabwe, their abundance, the 
trophy fee and the revenues obtainable from a safari. 
By giving villagers in communal lands a financial stake in 
conserving these animals, Zimbabwe is in the envious position of 
having relatively abundant wildlife populations.  The investiture of 
culling rights to a village creates two strong incentives.  First, there is 
a desire to maintain the herds at a relatively high level so culling is 
allowed, and second, villagers have a financial stake in preventing 
poaching, which is a serious problem in other parts of  Africa. The Zimbabwe experiment has been so successful that some 
villages have voluntarily removed all cattle from communal grazing 
land, thereby reducing the competition with wildlife for grass and 
water.  In the May,  1991 National Geographic Douglas Chadwick 
recounts the comments of  a Hwange tribal chief. 
For a long time the government told us that wildlife was their 
resource.  But I see how live animals can be our resource.  Our wealth. 
Our way to improve the standard of  living without waiting for the 
government to decide things.  A poacher is only stealing from us.  If 
our forefathers guide me, my task now is to bring this message to the 
people (Chadwick 1991, p. 42). 
The Zimbabwe model of  game management may strike some as 
simply catering to an elitist group of  "great white hunters," who wish 
to act out a fantasy in an Africa that no longer exists.  Some would 
argue that the killing of  all wildlife should stop.  In an imperfect 
world, however, perhaps the profitable harvest of  a few may contribute 
to the survival of  many.  And it's not just the survival of  elephant, Cape 
buffalo, kudu and zebra.  By removing fences and joining communal 
lands with existing game ranches, there is a potential to "reawaken" an 
immense regional ecosystem bordering on Zimbabwe, Botswana and 
Zambia. Iv. Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to extend the notion of  coevolution 
to the management of  parks and buffer zones in less developed 
countries.  Coevolutionary strategies might be defmed as a set of 
economic activities that allows a socioeconomic system and its 
supporting ecosystem to evolve nondestructively.  The definition of 
"nondestructive" might be operationally found by imposing lower 
bounds on an index of  biodiversity and upper bounds on an index of 
income inequality.  From the (hopefully nonempty) set of  activities that 
maintain biodiversity and satisfy economic justice, one might choose 
those which maximize the present value of  net revenues.  The 
opportunity cost of  biodiversity or equity might be analyzed by varying 
their constrained levels and seeing how the maximum present value of 
net revenue changes. 
There is evidence from southeast Asia, South America and 
Africa that parks and preserves are more likely to achieve their goals 
of  biological conservation if  they can give local residents a financial 
stake in their operation and maintenance.  Strategies where local 
residents are given jobs in facilities that support park tourism or 
exclusive (but transferable) rights to harvest park resources may 
reduce enforcement costs and may be more effective in the long-run. Determining which activities are acceptable from a 
coevolutionary perspective and which of  the acceptable activities is 
"best" will require an interdisciplinary research effort involving 
agricultural. biological and social scientists.  Agronomists would be 
needed to examine the suitability of  soils in the buffer zone for various 
types of  crops and agricultural practices.  Ecologists would attempt to 
link the location and scale of agricultural activities with the dynamics 
of  keystone species.  They would also be involved with the analysis of 
hunting and gathering activities within the buffer zone or park for 
plants and animals consumed by households or sold for cash.  As in the 
study of  minor forest products in the Amazonas, the emphasis would 
be on the level of  sustainable yield and its impact on forest ecosystems. 
Economists would work on the evaluation of  net benefits to 
households from small scale agriculture, hunting and gathering and 
attempt to evaluate the externalities that might arise within the buffer 
zone and park in later periods.  Development sociologists could play a 
role in examining the factors affecting population growth and 
migration and the establishment of  local institutions that might 
implement economic policies for promoting biological conservation. Interdisciplinary research is easy to propose but difficult to 
achieve.  The diverse set of  applied scientists needed to identify and 
promote coevolutionary strategies requires a shared understanding of 
the role that each might play within the broad dynamic scheme of 
things.  It also requires a humility and cooperative spirit that is 
sometimes lacking in academics who are programmed to operate in a 
more narrowly focused, competitive discipline.  Biological 
conservation may depend not only on our ability to understand and 
model the relevant physical, biological and social systems, but on the 
implementation of  policies that give individuals a financial stake in 
maintaining the biological "capital" on which current and future 
generations depend. References 
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